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COMMENTARY
avoidance of perverse incentives, and the difficulties in 
enforcing the duties of pregnant women. 
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act (UVVA) of 2004 
provides protection for fetuses harmed during military 
or federal crimes. In addition, 30 states have passed 
their own fetal homicide laws providing various degrees 
of legal status for fetuses. The UVVA states, “Whoever 
engages in conduct that violates any of the provisions 
of law...and thereby causes the death of, or bodily 
injury to, a child who is in utero at the time the conduct 
takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this 
section” (UVVA, 2004). However, it adds the provision, 
“Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the 
prosecution...of any woman with respect to her unborn 
child” (UVVA, 2004). Various state laws, however, do not 
provide such exemptions, and have opened the door to 
prosecution of women who refuse medical treatment 
while pregnant. Marshall Wilde from the University 
of Houston Health Law and Policy Institute comments, 
“There is no consistent message coming out of either 
state or federal courts with regards to the liability of a 
mother for the death of a child from failing to consent 
to medical treatment” (Wilde, 2003).
CASE
Ms. R, a 28 year-old gravida 4, para 4-0-0-5 with a twin 
intrauterine pregnancy at 38 weeks by last menstrual 
period, presented to her doctor with concerns about 
decreased fetal movement. Subsequent ultrasound 
showed oligohydramnios as well as intrauterine growth 
retardation of both twins. Fetal heart rates for both 
twins were in the 120s with decreased long-term vari-
ability and occasional variable decelerations. The physi-
cian recommended immediate cesarean section, but 
Ms. R declined. She returned for evaluation four times 
in the next several days; each time, immediate delivery 
was recommended and each time she refused. Eleven 
days after initial presentation, Ms. R consented to a 
cesarean and two infants were delivered. Twin A, a boy, 
was stillborn. Twin B, a girl, weighed two pounds, one 
ounce and had APGAR scores of two and five. Ms. R was 
then charged with criminal homicide in the death of 
Twin A. Two months after her indictment, she reached 
a plea agreement with the district attorney in which she 
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ABSTRACT
After several cases in which pregnant women were 
forced to undergo cesarean sections under court order 
or where court orders were sought for cesarean sec-
tions, the medical community reaffirmed the principle 
of autonomy for pregnant women. Women are allowed 
to refuse care during pregnancy, even if that means 
harm to the fetus. In addition, it is inappropriate for 
medical personnel to seek legal assistance in forcing a 
woman to accept treatment. This article presents a case 
in which the medical community upheld the woman’s 
right to refuse care; however, the legal community then 
charged her with criminal homicide under the state’s 
fetal homicide law because the baby was stillborn after 
the patient delayed in obtaining a cesarean section. 
The differences between medical guidelines and state 
law must be addressed so that the patient’s autonomy 
is upheld and so that patients may be informed of all 
consequences, medical and otherwise, of refusing treat-
ment. 
INTRODUCTION
Significant discussion of the rights of women during 
pregnancy followed several cases in the 1980s and 
1990s in which women refused treatment, usually a 
cesarean section, which was believed to be absolutely 
necessary in order to continue the fetus’ life. The dis-
pute surrounded the tension between a woman’s right 
to autonomy and a fetus’ right to life. The debate was 
eventually settled in favor of a woman’s autonomy 
and granted her nearly limitless ability to refuse any 
medical treatment if she so desired. In addition, it was 
made clear that a woman could not be forced to accept 
treatment by either coercion or direct court order. The 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG) states, “Obstetricians should refrain from per-
forming procedures that are unwanted by a pregnant 
woman. The use of judicial authority to implement 
treatment regimens to protect the fetus violates the 
pregnant woman’s autonomy and should be avoided” 
(ACOG, 2004). The justification for this position is 
founded on several things, including the principle of 
patient autonomy, the need to keep fetal rights from 
becoming superior to those of all other patients, the 
46  EJBM, Copyright © 2010
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
4Commentary
The Physician-Patient Relationship in Light of Fetal Homicide Laws
demand of Finnish-American young men that 
they undergo the surgery to save victims of the 
disease. (2004)
Perverse Incentives
The medical establishment has avoided seeking legal 
support that would require a woman to complete any 
recommended treatment, because it is feared that 
she might give up prenatal care altogether. David 
Orentlicher describes this situation as a “perverse 
incentive.” 
A legal duty may be counterproductive to its primary 
goal of enhancing the health of fetuses and therefore 
children. If a pregnant woman fears that unwanted 
treatment will be imposed, she might avoid the health-
care system entirely during her pregnancy, or she might 
terminate the patient-physician relationship with her 
obstetrician once unwanted treatment became an issue. 
As a result, her fetus might be worse off than if there 
were no legal duty (2001).
Difficulties with Enforcement
Pregnant women are given a long list of things they 
should do during pregnancy to ensure a positive 
outcome—eat a balanced diet, exercise regularly, take 
prenatal vitamins, and abstain from smoking, drink-
ing alcohol, and using any illicit drugs. While these are 
things most doctors agree women ought to be doing, 
no one is forcing women to comply with these direc-
tives. Similarly, a doctor might firmly believe that a 
cesarean section is in the best interest of the fetus. “If 
a woman is obliged to protect her fetus from harm by 
having a cesarean, then it is not unreasonable to sup-
pose that she might also be obliged to stop smoking to 
that same end” (Draper, 1996). Most Americans would 
find that to be an unreasonable infringement upon per-
sonal freedom, just as they would agree that a woman 
should not be required to follow a prescribed diet dur-
ing pregnancy. While a cesarean generally deals with 
life or death rather than low birth weight or low IQ, it 
still constitutes an infringement upon a woman’s body 
and freedom. “So long as the fetus is attached to the 
pregnant woman, her body maintains its life and bars 
access to it” (Ludwig, 1999).
Current Conflicts
These arguments and other supporting arguments have 
combined to create the current standards of practice 
in obstetrical care and have been upheld in numerous 
court cases throughout the country. However, a recent 
court case indirectly challenges this standard. In the 
case of State of Utah v. MacGuire, Martin MacGuire 
was charged with two counts of criminal homicide 
after shooting his ex-wife four times, causing her death 
and the death of the 13-week fetus she carried. The 
Utah Supreme Court upheld the charge of homicide in 
regard to the fetus, stating, “A person commits crimi-
nal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, 




Perhaps the most fundamental argument for a woman’s 
right to choose all medical treatment during pregnancy 
is that of patient autonomy. Autonomy—the belief that 
“every human being of adult years and sound mind 
has a right to determine what shall be done with his 
own body”—is a founding principle of American medi-
cal ethics (Hébert, 1996). Thus, a competent pregnant 
woman has the choice to refuse any medical care rec-
ommended, even if that choice results in the death of 
her fetus. The Court of Appeals in In Re A.C. made this 
principle clear. “Neither the viability of the fetus nor the 
potential harm to it are factors that can be used to jus-
tify overriding the woman’s wishes, nor is the fact that 
the intrusion on the woman might be deemed small 
given her health condition” (Thornton and Paltrow, 
1991). The Appellate Court of Illinois upheld this posi-
tion in In re: Baby Boy Doe v. Mother Doe, in which the 
court stated, “A woman’s competent choice to refuse 
medical treatment as invasive as a cesarean section dur-
ing pregnancy must be honored, even in circumstances 
where the choice may be harmful to her fetus” (1994).
Fetal Rights Are Not Superior
There are no provisions under current law that mandate 
that someone must undergo invasive medical treatment 
in order to save someone’s life. For example, a father is 
not required to become a living kidney donor in order to 
save his child from renal failure (Colb, 2004). This prin-
ciple was established in McFall v. Shimp, in which Shimp 
was not forced to undergo a bone-marrow transplant 
to save the life of his cousin, McFall, although Shimp 
was the only matched donor available. The court stated, 
“ one human being is under no legal compulsion to give 
aid or to take action to save another human being or 
to rescue” (1978). Likewise, a mother cannot be forced 
to endure any medical treatment for the sole purpose 
of benefiting the fetus. Some argue that requiring a 
pregnant woman to undergo a surgical procedure is 
unconstitutional, equivalent to targeting a group based 
upon gender or race or nationality. Sherry Colb, profes-
sor at Rutgers Law School, addresses this issue.
An example? It is difficult to invent one, but 
let us use our imaginations. Say a hypothetical 
(but devastating) disease—fabricitis—is quite 
common. Say also that the disease can be 
cured completely with the injection of liver 
cells from men of Finnish descent. The liver 
cells must be extracted from the men before 
they reach the age of 45, though, and the only 
way to accomplish the extraction is through 
abdominal surgery. The criminal law could not 
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bling to have somebody come in and say we’re going 
to charge this mother for murder because we don’t like 
the choices she made” (Z, 2004). 
The current dissonance between medical practice and 
state laws must be resolved so as to provide clear and 
appropriate guidelines for physicians and patients in 
these difficult situations. State laws should be amended 
with exemptions similar to those found in the UVVA. 
A clearly worded exemption providing for choice for 
pregnant women making health-care decisions will 
reduce much of the confusion and uncertainty that exist 
under the current fetal homicide laws. 
In the meantime, physicians and patients must be made 
aware of the legal precedents that protect patients’ 
autonomy. In addition to numerous court rulings, orga-
nizations such as ACOG have policies that uphold a 
woman’s right to deny procedures. 
Pregnancy is, for the most part, a happy and exciting 
time. Nevertheless, there are dangers and complications 
that can provide challenges for parents and physicians 
alike. Well-informed participants, strong communica-
tion and a harmonious relationship between the health-
care and the legal communities can serve to make these 
difficult times less demanding for all.
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embolism. In addition, women who have had cesarean 
sections are at increased risk of small bowel obstruction 
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cental accreta or increta with subsequent pregnancies 
(Danforth et al., 2003). 
CONCLUSION
Physicians have long recognized the internal struggle 
that exists when a pregnant woman refuses recom-
mended medical care, especially in the emergency 
setting. An obstetrician feels the obligation to act 
on behalf of both the patients—mother and baby. 
Nevertheless, situations arise in which the interests of 
the two are in conflict and the mother’s autonomy must 
be balanced with the fetus’ life. While fetal homicide 
laws may have a place in the legal system for prosecu-
tion when fetuses are injured during criminal acts, there 
must be clarification about the right of women to make 
decisions about their health care. For Ms. R to be pros-
ecuted under such a law violates established medical 
practices and infringes upon her autonomy as a person. 
In the Kaiser Daily Reproductive Health Report, Kent 
Morgan, deputy Salt Lake County prosecutor, stated in 
discussion of Ms. R’s case, “These cases we review on 
a case-by-case basis. If a mother causes the death of 
an unborn child in an unlawful way, she may well be 
facing murder charges” (2004). What Morgan fails to 
address here is that Ms. R did nothing unlawful. She 
simply took charge of her own health care, and made 
her own choices. While those choices had heartbreaking 
and tragic consequences, this does not constitute law-
breaking or murder. Marguerite Driessen, a law profes-
sor at Brigham Young University, states, “It’s very trou-
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